tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post7853596403945114848..comments2024-02-23T01:30:06.101-08:00Comments on Early Warning: Hurricane Hits Just-In-Time EconomyStuart Stanifordhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07182839827506265860noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post-14044477570852821712012-11-09T08:27:09.470-08:002012-11-09T08:27:09.470-08:004$ per gallon of petroleum is bad for me at least....4$ per gallon of petroleum is bad for me at least. With such lines at gas stations, I freak out. I go at nights, when there is a higher chance of getting your car filled :)<br /><br />Regards<br /><br />Good post<br /><br />.A-<br /><br /><a href="http://www.autotransportdepot.com" rel="nofollow">auto transport</a>Allanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16369892832026187999noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post-36587343917007921282012-11-05T06:27:30.950-08:002012-11-05T06:27:30.950-08:00http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cascading_failure
Al...http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cascading_failure<br /><br />Although JIT inventories don't provide for resilience, I think the threshold vulnerabilities of complex interdependent networks is probably more relevant. What is fascinating about cascading failures is that in the early onset the system appears incredibly resilient. Functioning nodes take up the load from failed ones and the network continues - until a certain (and usually difficult to predict) threshold is reached and then spectacular and sudden failure occurs. <br /><br />Networks are resilient by nature - but that same resilience also builds in a unique property of sudden and often unpredictable failure.Aaronhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12250785811384640662noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post-3999705415525774402012-11-02T08:21:03.998-07:002012-11-02T08:21:03.998-07:00Seems to me the headline should rather be, "H...Seems to me the headline should rather be, "Hurricane Hits Optimistically Engineered Infrastructure and Processes".<br /><br />Or maybe, "Society Fails to take Infrastructure Seriously, Pays Consequences".<br /><br />Just imagine how much worse the situation would be now, today, if not for corrective action prompted by the derecho and Hurricane Irene last year.<br /><br />With sufficiently frequent wake-up calls, the basic structure of the current system seems up to the task.Michael Rhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10045827917076142231noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post-80460305737946082502012-11-02T08:02:51.146-07:002012-11-02T08:02:51.146-07:00I had the impression that a large amount of the fi...I had the impression that a large amount of the financial trading infrastructure had already migrated outside Manhattan because of cost and disaster recovery considerations, while the MotU deal-making banker types still cling to the prestige addresses. <br /><br />The fact that the NYSE had to close for two days suggests my impression of Wall St "tech emigration" was an overestimate. Nevertheless, it's interesting to think of NYC being "shut down" as a natural experiment in how dependent the real economy is on the specific functions of NYC finance. If the wheeler-dealers were incommunicado while electronic trading proceeded apace, would anyone notice? <br /><br />Of course, the most urgent question is the fragility of our JIT approach to even food and energy. I sure hope the whole region affected by "Sandy" are able to recover quickly. Maybe their experience will give us all some insight into how to be more adaptable in future natural disruptions. <br /><br />Sethhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16486234948199900568noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5235419263414453422.post-27800968177043161112012-11-02T07:08:57.118-07:002012-11-02T07:08:57.118-07:00FEMA has spent tens of millions of its unclassifie...FEMA has spent tens of millions of its unclassified budget (95% or so classified, since it dealt with Continuity Of Government planning, a few years ago when I was familiar with it) to provide backup power facilities for designated "PEP" or "Primary Entry Point" AM radio broadcast facilities nationwide. I'd guess many government facilities also have access to fuel in the NYC area. <br /><br />Disaster planning generally assumes that most people will not be out and about following the incident, but home, listening to their AM radio, leaving the streets open to "official business". If the people become restless, the plan in place is not to provide fuel, but National Guard troops to maintain "order".<br /><br /><br /><br /><br />Mr. Sunshinehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16137274372934160799noreply@blogger.com